1991's Lesson for India: It Is Not About Diplomacy
C. Raja Mohan reads India's twin shocks of 1990-91 | the Kuwait war and the Soviet collapse | as a template for today's wars in Iran and Ukraine. His argument: the real lesson is not diplomatic skill but domestic reform, and a foreign policy debate willing to think against the consensus.

India is again being tested by simultaneous upheavals in the Middle East and Europe | just as it was in 1990-91. C. Raja Mohan argues that the wars in Iran and Ukraine are forcing Delhi to reconsider the foundations of its national strategy. The obvious reading is that the answer is better diplomacy. The harder question is whether that is enough.
What lesson does 1991 hold for India's response to today's wars?
C. Raja Mohan argues that 1990-91, when the Kuwait war and the Soviet collapse hit India together, forced economic reform and new partnerships, not just better diplomacy. With the Iran war disrupting Hormuz and the Ukraine war in its fifth year, he says the real lesson is domestic reform and a willingness to rethink strategic consensus.
The Story in 60 Seconds
What Actually Happened?
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US-led war to reverse the annexation sent oil prices soaring, disrupted remittances and aggravated India's balance-of-payments crisis. Within months, the Soviet Union, the principal anchor of Indian foreign policy during the Cold War, collapsed.
The twin shocks forced India to reform its economy, diversify its international partnerships and rethink its place in the world. Today, the war that began with the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader on February 28 has raised energy costs, disrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and exposed India's dependence on the Middle East.
In Europe, the Ukraine war has entered its fifth year without a clear path to settlement. Russia is not about to disintegrate as the Soviet Union did in 1991, but the prolonged conflict, with its mounting costs, is generating new questions about Russia's future at home and abroad.
What remains unclear is how far American pressure will go. Sanctions legislation linked to the late Senator Lindsey Graham proposes punitive tariffs against China, India and others importing Russian oil, and President Trump has called for it to be expanded to cover Iran. India's energy diplomacy faces increasing stress either way.
Meet the Players
India — New Delhi
The target of the shocks
India is much better placed than it was in 1991 | a larger economy, greater diplomatic weight and wider partnerships. But its exposure to the world, and the resulting vulnerabilities, are also greater. Delhi has shown flexibility so far, but the days ahead could get trickier.
Russia — Moscow
The fraying partner
The debate on Russia is personalised around Putin and sentimentalised through memories of Soviet support for India. That obscures the need to examine Russia's internal strains, its changing relationship with China, and its imperatives for reconciling with Europe and America.
Iran — Tehran
The new Middle East war
The war that began with the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader has raised energy costs and disrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Sympathy for Tehran in India often rests less on the Islamic Republic's conduct than on its resistance to America.
Why Isn't Diplomacy Enough?
This is the heart of Raja Mohan's argument. In 1991, India's official position was caught between competing imperatives: evacuate a large expatriate population, preserve relations with Iraq and the Arab world, respond to the violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, and accommodate the overwhelming military power assembled by the United States. The government's contradictory manoeuvres | Foreign Minister I K Gujral's embrace of Saddam and the provision of refuelling facilities to American aircraft | reflected these multiple pressures.
The domestic strategic consensus in 1991 was hardly realistic. Large sections of the establishment sympathised with Saddam, viewed as a friend of India, and denounced Mikhail Gorbachev's accommodation with the West. When communist hardliners attempted a coup in August 1991, there was barely concealed glee in parts of Delhi. The coup collapsed in three days; the Soviet Union disappeared in December. The protagonists have changed, but the instinct survives.
How Did We Get Here?
- Aug 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait; oil prices soar, remittances are disrupted and India's balance-of-payments crisis deepens
- 1991 US-led coalition reverses the annexation; India juggles evacuations, relations with Iraq and refuelling for American aircraft
- Jul 1991 India launches sweeping economic reform | liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation | to cope with the twin shocks
- Aug 1991 Soviet hardliners attempt a coup; it collapses within three days, exposing the old order's fragility
- Dec 1991 The Soviet Union formally disintegrates; India's principal Cold War anchor vanishes
- Feb 2026 War begins with the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader; energy costs rise and Strait of Hormuz navigation is disrupted
- 2026 The Ukraine war enters its fifth year without a clear path to settlement
What Does 'No Balance of Power Is Permanent' Actually Mean?
Economic Reform Impact
| Dimension | What it means |
|---|---|
| Permanence | The certainties of the 1980s | a stable Soviet Union, a bipolar order, dependable partnerships | vanished with astonishing speed in 1991 |
| Unpredictability | Unpredictability is not an interruption of normal international politics; it is one of its permanent features |
| Strategy | Indian strategy must devote as much attention to discontinuity as to continuity |
The point is not that chaos is inevitable, but that strategy built on fixed assumptions will repeatedly be surprised. The 1991 collapse was not the exception; it was the norm asserting itself.
Connect the Dots
- External shock in Middle East or Europe
- Economic pressure on India
- Strategic assumptions questioned
- Domestic reform
- Resilience in a changing world
But Is India's Challenge Really About Diplomacy?
Policy Effectiveness Analysis
| Interpretation | Core claim |
|---|---|
| The diplomatic reading | India can manage the shocks through flexibility, diversification and skilful engagement |
| Raja Mohan's reading | External shocks and systemic changes cannot be managed by diplomacy alone; what rescued India after 1991 was internal reform |
| The institutional reading | India needs stronger expertise on Russia, Iran, Central Asia and the Middle East, and institutions that reward contrarian judgment |
What Happens Next?
- Scenario A: Sanctions deepen — Punitive US tariffs target Russian-oil importers, squeezing India's energy diplomacy and forcing harder choices
- Scenario B: Iran conflict escalates — Energy costs and Hormuz disruption persist, exposing India's Middle East dependence
- Scenario C: Russia frays — Prolonged war generates new questions about Russia's internal future and its relationship with China
- Scenario D: Reform returns — India treats the shock as a reason for sweeping domestic reform, as it did after 1991
What would we need to see before concluding that the pattern is repeating? The telltale sign is whether India invests in regional expertise and institutional debate, and whether domestic reform returns to the centre of the national agenda | not whether Delhi manages each crisis smoothly.
Why India Should Care
International Relations Analysis - Table 3
| Why it matters | The detail |
|---|---|
| Energy security | India's dependence on Middle East energy means Hormuz disruption and rising prices hit directly |
| Balance of payments | Oil import bills and Gulf remittances are both exposed to regional conflict, as they were in 1990-91 |
| Sanctions pressure | US punitive tariffs on Russian-oil importers could target India and China directly |
| Strategic debate | A foreign policy community organised around a rigid consensus will repeatedly miss inconvenient possibilities |
What should New Delhi watch? The course of American sanctions, the trajectory of the Iran war and the internal politics of Russia | not just the diplomatic headlines of the moment.
Who Could Gain? Who Could Feel Pressure?
International Relations Analysis - Table 4
| Possible gain | The detail |
|---|---|
| India's reform agenda | As in 1991, an external shock could force the sweeping domestic reform that builds resilience |
| Diversified partnerships | A wider network of partners cushions India against dependence on any single patron |
| Contrarian institutions | Institutions willing to test competing scenarios become strategic assets in themselves |
International Relations Analysis - Table 5
| Possible pressure | The detail |
|---|---|
| Energy importers | Higher oil prices and disrupted navigation raise costs across the economy |
| Gulf expatriates | Regional conflict threatens the remittance flows millions of Indian families rely on |
| The foreign policy establishment | Entrenched sympathy for Iran and Russia can blind Delhi to its own interests |
These are potential effects, not established outcomes. They depend on how the wars, sanctions and India's own choices evolve.
How Should We Judge India's Strategy?
- 1. Realism: does India treat unpredictability as a permanent feature of international politics?
- 2. Debate: does the foreign policy community reward contrarian judgment?
- 3. Expertise: is India investing in languages, history and regional specialisation?
- 4. Reform: is domestic transformation treated as the core of resilience?
- 5. Diplomacy's role: is diplomacy used to support internal change, not replace it?
An initial assessment
| Realism | High | India has shown considerable flexibility in navigating pressures so far |
|---|---|---|
| Expertise and debate | Potentially high | The government appears more flexible than the foreign policy debate surrounding it might suggest |
| Domestic reform | Yet to be demonstrated | What rescued India in 1991 was internal reform; the answer today must be the same |
Raja Mohan's argument is that India's strategic resilience ultimately rests on domestic reform, not on diplomatic skill alone. The political will to reform is the variable that matters most.
CONCEPT BEHIND THE NEWS
Bottom Line
India faces simultaneous upheavals in the Middle East and Europe that echo the twin shocks of 1990-91. Raja Mohan's three lessons: no balance of power is permanent, debate itself is a strategic asset, and external shocks are ultimately managed through domestic reform. India is better placed than in 1991, but more exposed. The test is whether New Delhi builds the expertise, institutions and reform agenda that make it resilient in a permanently unpredictable world.
Key Terms
- Balance of power: the distribution of military and economic capability among states that shapes the international order
- Balance-of-payments crisis: when a country cannot pay for essential imports or service external debt, forcing policy change
- Strait of Hormuz: the narrow waterway through which a large share of the world's oil passes; a chokepoint for India's energy security
- Sanctions: coercive measures, such as tariffs, imposed by one state on another to change its behaviour
- Strategic autonomy: India's capacity to make independent foreign policy choices without dependency on any single patron
Read More
- The Indian Express (Original article source)
- Explore More (Related articles in International Relations)
Sources & Further Reading
- Primary: C Raja Mohan, '1991's biggest lesson for India is not about diplomacy', The Indian Express, July 21-22, 2026
- Analysis: Indian Express opinion section on India's foreign policy and the 1991 reforms
- Context: accounts of the 1990-91 balance-of-payments crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union