India's West Asia Strategy: Time to Pivot?
Pakistan's 2026 defence pact with Saudi Arabia challenges India's multi-alignment doctrine. With 60% of oil imports through Hormuz and $51.4B in Gulf remittances at stake, Shashi Tharoor argues India must shift to explicit security partnerships.
In September 2026, columnist Shashi Tharoor argued in Business Today that India's traditional multi-alignment strategy in West Asia is losing relevance. The August 2026 Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence pact catalyzed his analysis: Gulf states now prioritize explicit security commitments over economic partnerships. India imports 60% of its oil via the Strait of Hormuz and receives $51.4B in annual remittances from the region (38% of total remittances). Without concrete defence partnerships to match Pakistan's explicit ties, India risks strategic marginalization in one of its most critical energy and diaspora corridors.
What is India’s West Asia strategy in 2026?
India’s multi-alignment doctrine, partnering with Israel and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar simultaneously, is under pressure after the August 2026 Pakistan-Saudi defence pact. Shashi Tharoor argues India must move to explicit security partnerships or risk marginalisation in a region it depends on for 60% of oil imports and $51.4B in remittances.
We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.
Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, House of Commons, 1 March 1848
What Actually Happened?
In August 2026, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia announced a multi-billion dollar defence cooperation agreement. The pact includes military training, joint exercises, technology transfer, and procurement partnerships. Pakistan's explicit defence commitment to its major ally signals a geopolitical shift in the Gulf.
Shashi Tharoor's Business Today column (September 5, 2026) framed this as a watershed moment. India's West Asia strategy, he argued, assumed that economic interdependence (trade, investment, remittances) would suffice as diplomatic glue. Pakistan's move reveals that Gulf states now demand explicit security partnerships with military credibility.
Tharoor's central claim: India's 'ambiguous multi-alignment' (balancing Israel AND Iran, Saudi Arabia AND Qatar) worked when Gulf states were economically focused. In 2026, with US-Iran tensions, Chinese military advances, and internal Gulf competition, security hierarchy displaced economic calculation.
India's Traditional Strategy in West Asia
India's relationship with West Asia evolved through distinct phases. From 1947 to 1991, India pursued non-aligned solidarity with Arab states. India recognized Palestine in 1974 (before most non-Arab nations) and formalized diplomatic ties in 1988. The Arab bloc viewed India as a fellow post-colonial power against Western imperialism.
In 1991, India's economic liberalization coincided with the First Gulf War. India shifted strategy: move beyond political solidarity toward economic engagement. Between 1991 and 2014, India deepened trade ties with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Oman. Indians became dominant presence in Gulf labour markets (6+ million expatriates).
The 2005-2014 period saw India's 'Look West' policy. Strategic engagement with Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia simultaneously. India signed strategic partnerships without explicit security commitments. Framed as 'balancing act': India could engage security-conscious Israel (technology, defence) while maintaining ties with Iran (energy, infrastructure) and Gulf Arab states.
After 2014, India accelerated Israel engagement. PM Modi visited Israel (2017), the first PM visit in 15 years. In 2020, Israel-UAE normalized relations (Abraham Accords), with India's tacit support. India's 2023-2026 strategy assumed this flexibility would endure: Israel AND Palestine, Saudi Arabia AND Iran (through BRICS membership from 2024).
How Did We Get Here?
- 1974 India recognizes Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as legitimate representative of Palestinian people. Positions India as Arab bloc ally against Western/Israeli interests.
- 1988 India formalizes full diplomatic relations with Palestine. Strengthens standing in Arab world during non-aligned movement's waning years.
- 1991 Gulf War I and India's economic liberalization coincide. Shift from political solidarity to economic pragmatism begins. India deepens trade ties with Gulf monarchies.
- 2005 India launches 'Look West' policy. Deepens engagement with Iran (energy partnership), Israel (technology), and Saudi Arabia (trade) simultaneously. Multi-alignment framework solidifies.
- 2014 Modi government accelerates Israel engagement. Visits Israel (first PM visit in 15 years). Signals shift from Arab-centric policy toward balancing multiple interests.
- 2020 Abraham Accords reshape Middle East. Israel-UAE normalization marks end of 'Palestine solidarity as prerequisite' model. India tacitly supports while maintaining Iran ties.
- 2026 (Aug) Pakistan-Saudi defence pact signals security-first shift. Economic ties no longer sufficient. Tharoor's analysis: India's ambiguity becomes liability.
Connect the Dots
- 1. Economic ties + diaspora diplomacy sufficient (1990s-2010s) | Trade, labour, investment were primary anchors
- 2. Gulf states willing to work with India on multiple fronts | Energy partnership (Iran), Defence interest (Israel), Trade (Saudi Arabia)
- 3. Geopolitics shifted dramatically (2015-2026) | US-Iran tensions escalate; Chinese military advances; Gulf states prioritize security
- 4. Pakistan demonstrates value of explicit security commitment | Defence pact with Saudi Arabia shows clear alignment
- 5. India's ambiguity becomes perceived as weakness | Multi-alignment flexibility is now strategic liability, not asset
- 6. Tharoor's conclusion | Multi-alignment requires concrete defence capabilities, not just balancing acts
The Energy Chokepoint
India's vulnerability in West Asia centers on the Strait of Hormuz. This 21-mile strait between Iran and Oman is the world's most critical oil chokepoint. Approximately 21 million barrels of oil pass through daily (33% of world's seaborne oil).
India's dependency: 60% of crude oil imports transit Hormuz; 88% of India's LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) imports pass through the strait; 55% of LNG (liquefied natural gas) imports route through Hormuz. In absolute terms, India imported 220 million tonnes of crude oil in 2025-26; over 130 million tonnes came via Hormuz.
Remittance vulnerability: $51.4B of India's $135.4B annual remittances originate in Gulf states (Saudi Arabia $17B, UAE $13B, Kuwait $8B, Oman $5B, Qatar $5B). These flows support 20+ million Indian households directly.
If Hormuz closes (due to US-Iran escalation or regional conflict), India faces simultaneous shocks: energy crisis (petrol prices spike 200%+, power generation halts), remittance disruption (Gulf economies contract, expatriate layoffs), and inflation explosion. Tharoor's implicit argument: India needs security depth to influence or navigate such crises.
The Debate on Multi-Alignment
Strategic thinkers hold competing views on whether multi-alignment remains viable for India in 2026. Three schools argue their case with empirical evidence from recent regional alignments.
| Position | Defenders | Evidence & Logic |
|---|---|---|
| Multi-alignment is India's strength | Strategic autonomy advocates | India can engage Israel (tech, defence) + Iran (energy, infrastructure) + Saudi Arabia (trade, regional stability). Flexibility is asset in multipolar world. Don't lock into blocs; maintain options. |
| Alignment necessary for security | Tharoor & realist analysts | Pakistan's explicit Saudi defence tie is more valuable than India's ambiguous friendships. Gulf states now demand security commitments. Balancing acts work only when partners don't need to choose sides. US-Iran tensions force choice. |
| Hybrid model: multi-alignment + defence depth | Pragmatists | India should maintain multi-alignment framework (political flexibility) while making concrete defence commitments (military capabilities, joint exercises, arms sales). Don't abandon Iran ties; deepen Saudi/UAE defence cooperation simultaneously. |
India's Oil Imports by Source (2024-2026)
| Iraq | 30 |
|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 25 |
| Kuwait | 12 |
| UAE | 8 |
| Russia | 18 |
| Others | 7 |
India's Strategic Vulnerabilities
| Vulnerability | Specifics | Strategic Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Hormuz chokepoint | 60%+ oil, 88% LPG, 55% LNG transit Hormuz | Energy crisis if chokepoint closes. Petrol prices spike; power generation halts; inflation explodes. |
| Remittance dependency | $51.4B (38% of total remittances) from Gulf | Gulf economic contraction (war, sanctions) triggers massive outflow reversal. Affects 20+ million Indian households. |
| Pakistan's leverage increasing | Pakistan-Saudi defence pact shows explicit commitment | India's ambiguous approach losing credibility. Pakistan's clearer alignment attracts more security investment from Gulf. |
| Lost Arab bloc advantage | Arab states no longer automatic India allies | India can't rely on Arab solidarity on UN votes, trade, or diplomatic issues. Must earn support through tangible value. |
| Energy import dependency | 89% of crude oil imports required | No spare capacity to absorb supply shocks. Renewables transition (target 500 GW by 2030) still years away from impact. |
What Could Happen Next?
Four plausible scenarios flow from India's strategic choices over the next 2-3 years. Each carries different implications for energy security, regional influence, and remittance flows.
- Scenario 1: India adapts quickly — India announces major defence partnerships (joint naval exercises with Saudi Arabia, missile defence cooperation with UAE, technology transfer agreements with Israel). Maintains BRICS ties with Iran through compartmentalization. Gulf states respect explicit commitment. India gains influence in regional security architecture.
- Scenario 2: India remains ambiguous — No major defence commitments announced. India maintains 'balancing act' rhetoric. Gulf states gradually shift strategic partnerships toward Pakistan and China. India's influence declines. By 2035, India is dialogue partner, not strategic power.
- Scenario 3: Chabahar escape route — India completes Chabahar port operationalization (currently 25% complete). Diversifies energy flows through Iran-India corridor. Reduces Hormuz dependency from 60% to 35% by 2032. Provides partial strategic autonomy. Requires sustained Iran engagement despite US pressure.
- Scenario 4: Hormuz crisis + Indian scramble — US-Iran escalation closes Hormuz (March 2027 scenario). Oil prices spike to $150/barrel. Remittances collapse 40%. India mobilizes emergency energy reserves. Chabahar accelerates. India forced into explicit security partnerships overnight at worse negotiating position.
Why This Matters for India
Tharoor's argument strikes at India's strategic identity. For 30 years (1991-2021), India's non-alignment framework achieved diplomatic balancing without military commitment. Energy flowed, remittances arrived, trade grew. The question Tharoor poses: does 2026 mark the end of that era?
If yes, India must pivot: invest in defence partnerships, develop military-grade capabilities valuable to Gulf security architecture, position itself as security provider, not just economic partner. This requires reorienting defence spending (currently ~2% of budget) toward Gulf-centric capabilities: naval presence, cyber defence, drone technology.
If no (multi-alignment still works), India maintains current strategy but risks gradually declining influence and remittance stability. Pakistan gains Gulf access India forfeits.
Why This Matters for the Global South
Tharoor's analysis reflects a broader Global South dilemma. Emerging markets assumed economic interdependence would ensure stable partnerships. West Asia's 2026 reality suggests security concerns now override economic calculation. For Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other non-aligned powers, the implication is stark: ambiguity may no longer protect strategic autonomy. Blocs are hardening.
The Abraham Accords (2020) and Pakistan-Saudi pact (2026) signal that regional powers can no longer maintain equal distance from all parties. Geopolitical pressure forces alignment. India's struggle to adapt is representative of the Global South's broader strategic challenge: how to maintain autonomy in an era of bipolar great power competition (US vs. China).
What Should We Watch?
- India-Saudi Defence Cooperation 2026-2027 | Depth of Indian military presence in Saudi exercises, technology transfer specifics, arms procurement timelines.
- Chabahar Port Operationalization | Current capacity (1-2 cargo ships/day) vs. target (10+/day by 2030). Percentage completion; cost overruns; Iran sanctions impact.
- Pakistan-Saudi Pact Evolution | Expansion to other Gulf states? UAE, Kuwait defence agreements with Pakistan? Signal of India's declining Gulf clout.
- US-Iran Escalation Risk | Hormuz closure probability 2027-2028. Oil price impacts; global recession triggers; India's energy emergency response.
- Modi's West Asia Visits 2027 | Frequency, bilateral defence agreements announced, remittance security initiatives.
- Gulf Remittance Stability | Year-over-year remittance flows from Saudi Arabia, UAE. Indicator of economic stability and wage stability for Indian expatriates.
Bottom Line
India's traditional West Asia strategy of multi-alignment, balancing Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine simultaneously, achieved 30 years of economic returns (energy flows, remittances, trade) without military commitment. Shashi Tharoor's September 2026 Business Today column suggests this era is ending. Pakistan's explicit defence pact with Saudi Arabia signals that Gulf states now prioritize security partnerships over economic friendships. India's ambiguity, once a diplomatic strength, is being perceived as strategic weakness.
The stakes are concrete and urgent. India imports 60%+ of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz and receives $51.4B in annual remittances from Gulf states (38% of all remittances). Without strategic depth, including explicit defence partnerships, demonstrated military value, and alternatives to Hormuz like Chabahar port, India risks marginalization in one of its most critical regions.
Whether Tharoor's analysis proves prescient depends on three variables: (1) Does India quickly pivot toward Gulf-focused defence investment? (2) Can India complete Chabahar operationalization, reducing Hormuz dependency? (3) Does a major US-Iran escalation force India's hand, making adaptation urgent rather than strategic? The answer lies in India's policy choices 2027-2029.
Key Terms
Sources & Further Reading
Read More
- Ministry of External Affairs: West Asia Policy (Official Indian government position on West Asia engagement, strategic partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives.)
- India-Japan Defence Cooperation (Analysis of India's existing bilateral defence frameworks in Asia-Pacific (model for potential Gulf expansion).)
- India Current Account Deficit FY27 (India's energy import dependency and economic vulnerability to oil price shocks.)
- Business Today | Shashi Tharoor column: 'Why India's old West Asia strategy may be losing relevance' (September 5, 2026)
- Ministry of External Affairs | Annual Reports on West Asia engagement (2020-2026)
- Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas | Energy Security Report 2026 (oil import sources, Hormuz dependency quantification)
- RBI | Balance of Payments data on remittances by source country (2024-2026)
- Indian Express | 'Pakistan-Saudi Defence Pact and India's Options' (August 2026 analysis)
- Observer Research Foundation (ORF) | 'Multi-alignment in the Age of Competing Blocs' (2026 policy paper)
- Council on Foreign Relations | 'The Strait of Hormuz: Geopolitics and Energy Security' (2025 analysis)